This is not a person who would stop killing on his own. There are 3 reasons to stop:
1. Death
2. Prison
3. Too disabled or sick to kill
Period. This is a compulsive psychopath who enjoyed killing and wouldn't give it up.
I generally give more detailed analyses but due to limited information, this is what I can provide."
Dr. Deborah Schurman-Kauflin
Violent Crimes Institute President
Saturday, January 9, 2010
Monday, November 16, 2009
consumption 6.con.221 Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire
The Great Pit
"There's a hole in the world
Like a great black pit
and the vermin of the world inhabit it
And its morals aren't worth
what a pig could spit
And it goes by the name of London."
"No Place like London" by Stephen Sondheim from Sweeney Todd
Life was cheap in 18th century London. As the industrial revolution gathered steam and refugees from the shires flocked to the great city in search of work, the city, which was still reeling from the recent plague years, was unprepared, civilly and morally, for the great influx of population. Poverty and decadence were widespread, and the separation between the classes was distinct.
For all intents and purposes, there were three classes of people in London at the beginning of the industrial revolution: the gentry, who included those with land and title, the merchants, or shop and factory owners, and the working class, which was by far the largest of the three classes. Within the working class were those who worked either in the factories or stores, and those who subsisted through service to the other classes. Beneath all of these was the underclass of beggars, thieves, and prostitutes and common criminals. Movement between classes was rare, except in a downward spiral, and many working class people were forced by situations into the beggar and criminal underclass.
London's poor street
London's poor street
Although the city had managed to survive the late 17th century plague, disease was prevalent in London as sanitary conditions in the growing municipality were less than ideal. The Thames River was considered the dirtiest river in Europe: raw sewage and industrial waste was dumped into the street without second thought. Smallpox, plague, fever and consumption were the most common causes of death — not including accident.
In an effort to survive, whole families, including children, would work for just pennies a day in the mills and factories that had sprung up around the city. Tenements housing dozens of families in small apartments dotted the landscape creating a dismal scene of poverty and chaos. Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire Thieves, ruffians and "sturdy beggars" plagued the streets of the capital, and no one dared walk the streets at night, for fear of his life.
Charles Dickens summed up life for the working class and London in general in Oliver Twist: "The street was narrow and muddy, and the air was impregnated with filthy odours... Drunken men and women were positively wallowing in filth; and from several of the doorways, great ill-looking fellows were cautiously emerging, bound, to all appearance, on no very well-disposed or harmless errands."
"There's a hole in the world
Like a great black pit
and the vermin of the world inhabit it
And its morals aren't worth
what a pig could spit
And it goes by the name of London."
"No Place like London" by Stephen Sondheim from Sweeney Todd
Life was cheap in 18th century London. As the industrial revolution gathered steam and refugees from the shires flocked to the great city in search of work, the city, which was still reeling from the recent plague years, was unprepared, civilly and morally, for the great influx of population. Poverty and decadence were widespread, and the separation between the classes was distinct.
For all intents and purposes, there were three classes of people in London at the beginning of the industrial revolution: the gentry, who included those with land and title, the merchants, or shop and factory owners, and the working class, which was by far the largest of the three classes. Within the working class were those who worked either in the factories or stores, and those who subsisted through service to the other classes. Beneath all of these was the underclass of beggars, thieves, and prostitutes and common criminals. Movement between classes was rare, except in a downward spiral, and many working class people were forced by situations into the beggar and criminal underclass.
London's poor street
London's poor street
Although the city had managed to survive the late 17th century plague, disease was prevalent in London as sanitary conditions in the growing municipality were less than ideal. The Thames River was considered the dirtiest river in Europe: raw sewage and industrial waste was dumped into the street without second thought. Smallpox, plague, fever and consumption were the most common causes of death — not including accident.
In an effort to survive, whole families, including children, would work for just pennies a day in the mills and factories that had sprung up around the city. Tenements housing dozens of families in small apartments dotted the landscape creating a dismal scene of poverty and chaos. Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire Thieves, ruffians and "sturdy beggars" plagued the streets of the capital, and no one dared walk the streets at night, for fear of his life.
Charles Dickens summed up life for the working class and London in general in Oliver Twist: "The street was narrow and muddy, and the air was impregnated with filthy odours... Drunken men and women were positively wallowing in filth; and from several of the doorways, great ill-looking fellows were cautiously emerging, bound, to all appearance, on no very well-disposed or harmless errands."
Thursday, September 24, 2009
letters 4.let.0040040 Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire
During our review of records at FBI headquarters, we found a July 8, 1947, teletype message from the FBI office in Dallas, Texas, to FBI headquarters and the FBI office in Cincinnati, Ohio. An FBI spokesperson confirmed the authenticity of the message.
According to the message, an Eighth Air Force headquarters official had telephonically informed the FBI's Dallas office of the recovery near Roswell of a hexagonal-shaped disc suspended from a large balloon by cable. The message further stated that the disc and balloon were being sent to Wright Field (now Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio) for examination. According to the Eighth Air Force official, the recovered object resembled a high-altitude weather balloon with a radar reflector. The message stated that no further investigation by the FBI was being conducted. (A copy of the teletype message appears in app. II.)
To follow up on the July 8th message, we reviewed microfilm abstracts of the FBI Dallas and Cincinnati office activities for July 1947. An abstract prepared by the FBI Dallas office on July 12, 1947, summarized the particulars of the July 8th message. There was no mention in the Cincinnati office abstracts of the crash or recovery of an airborne object near Roswell.
Because the FBI message reported that debris from the Roswell crash was being transported to Wright Field for examination, we attempted to determine whether military regulations existed for handling such debris. We were unable to locate any applicable regulation. As a final step, we reviewed Air Materiel Command (Wright Field) records from 1947 to 1950 for evidence of command personnel involvement in this matter. We found no records mentioning the Roswell crash or the examination by Air Materiel Command personnel of any debris recovered from the crash.
QUERIES TO FEDERAL AGENCIES REGARDING RECORDS ON THE CRASH
We sent letters to several federal agencies asking for any government records they might have concerning the Roswell crash. In this regard, we contacted DOD, the National Security Council, the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy, the CIA, the FBI, and the Department of Energy.
The National Security Council, the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy, and the Department of Energy responded that they had no government records relating to the Roswell crash. (Copies of their responses appear in app. III, IV, and V.) The FBI, DOD, and the CIA provided the following information.
According to the message, an Eighth Air Force headquarters official had telephonically informed the FBI's Dallas office of the recovery near Roswell of a hexagonal-shaped disc suspended from a large balloon by cable. The message further stated that the disc and balloon were being sent to Wright Field (now Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio) for examination. According to the Eighth Air Force official, the recovered object resembled a high-altitude weather balloon with a radar reflector. The message stated that no further investigation by the FBI was being conducted. (A copy of the teletype message appears in app. II.)
To follow up on the July 8th message, we reviewed microfilm abstracts of the FBI Dallas and Cincinnati office activities for July 1947. An abstract prepared by the FBI Dallas office on July 12, 1947, summarized the particulars of the July 8th message. There was no mention in the Cincinnati office abstracts of the crash or recovery of an airborne object near Roswell.
Because the FBI message reported that debris from the Roswell crash was being transported to Wright Field for examination, we attempted to determine whether military regulations existed for handling such debris. We were unable to locate any applicable regulation. As a final step, we reviewed Air Materiel Command (Wright Field) records from 1947 to 1950 for evidence of command personnel involvement in this matter. We found no records mentioning the Roswell crash or the examination by Air Materiel Command personnel of any debris recovered from the crash.
QUERIES TO FEDERAL AGENCIES REGARDING RECORDS ON THE CRASH
We sent letters to several federal agencies asking for any government records they might have concerning the Roswell crash. In this regard, we contacted DOD, the National Security Council, the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy, the CIA, the FBI, and the Department of Energy.
The National Security Council, the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy, and the Department of Energy responded that they had no government records relating to the Roswell crash. (Copies of their responses appear in app. III, IV, and V.) The FBI, DOD, and the CIA provided the following information.
Sunday, August 2, 2009
Tachibana Incident 4.tac.0002 Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire
THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
Furthermore, reports were to be made on warships and aircraft carriers at anchor, and although not so important, those tied up at wharves, buoys, and in docks. The types and classes of vessels were to be designated briefly and special mention was to be made when two or more vessels were alongside the same wharf.[584] Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire
On September 29, 1941 the details of a special code to be used in referring to the location of American warships in Pearl Harbor was sent to Tokyo through diplomatic channels. "KS" meant the repair dock in the Navy yard; "FV" was the moorings in the vicinity of Ford Island; "FG" designated the location alongside Ford Island; and "A" and "B" indicated east and west sides of "FG" respectively.[585]
151. Japanese Report on American Transportation of English Troops
Consul Nagao Kita, on October 2, 1941, reported that an American steamship, possibly the Monterey from Australia, had entered port bearing approximately 600 Australians and New Zealand air corps troops under the command of Wing Commander Axel Richards. English language newspapermen stated that this was the first instance of an American ship being used to transport English troops.[586]
(e) Reports from South America
152. Japanese Interest in Brazilian Air Fields
The Japanese Foreign Minister, in a dispatch to Rio de Janeiro on September 29, 1941, asked that plans for landing fields on islands near Brazil be investigated and the information be sent to Tokyo at once.[587]
153. Minister Ishii Reports American Planes Arriving in Brazil
Japanese Minister Itaro Ishii in Rio de Janeiro informed Ambassador Nomura in Washington that the United States was dispatching weekly two large planes, each capable of carrying 62 persons, to Bathhurst in British Gambia. According to information gathered by Consul Ishii, plans were being made to dispatch by plane several thousand technicians, possibly including military officers.[588]
(f) Reports from Capetown, South Africa
154. Japanese Agents Reports the Transportation of British Soldiers
Two Japanese naval intelligence dispatches from Capetown, South Africa to Tokyo contained information concerning British vessels entering that port, and accordingly were retransmitted to Berlin. Approximately 8,000 British soldiers whose destination appeared to be Iran were embarked on five large transports, accompanied by a 7,000- or 8,000-ton cruiser, which had entered port on September 11, 1941 and sailed again September 14.
155. Japan Watches British Shipping Near Cape of Good Hope
As an aid to Russia, Britain was dispatching airplanes to the Eastern Front, along with aviators, extra machinery parts, gasoline, repair materials and technicians. Some of those were being transported via the White Sea and Murmansk, and part were being sent by the Cape route via Iran.[589]
[584] III, 356.
[585] III, 357.
[586] III, 358.
[587] III, 359.
[588] III, 360.
[589] III, 361.
[131]
Between September 16 and 21, 1941 seven British vessels were reported by Japanese spies to have entered Capetown for two-day stopovers. A camouflaged cruiser, on which a number of soldiers had embarked, and which appeared to be headed for Iran, entered port on September 18, and sailed on September 20, 1941.[590]
(g) Reports from Vladivostok, Russia
156. Departure of Russian Submarines
From Japanese diplomats in Vladivostok, came a ship movement report on September 4, 1941. It revealed that most of the Russian submarines seemed to have gone to sea, though their minesweepers were still engaging in strenuous daily practice. Detailed descriptions of the ships in the harbor and the arrival of a United States tanker on September 3, 1941 were reported.[591]
157. Japanese Learn of British Supply Route to Russia
On October 15, 1941 Japanese intelligence reports revealed that a tremendous amount of British supplies was being shipped to Russia through Capetown, Durban and Lourenco Marques. Aid to Russia via Iran had become difficult owing to a lack of docking facilities in the Persian Gulf, and because of poorly operated railroads in Iran. For this reason Russia and Great Britain had decided to appoint Brigadier General Sir Godfrey Dean Rhodes, then Director of Railways and Harbors in British Kenyauganda, to the position of Director of Transportation in Iran.[592]
[590] III, 362.
[591] III, 363.
[592] III, 364.
[132]
THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
PART C—JAPANESE DIPLOMATIC ACTIVITIES THROUGHOUT THE WORLD
(a) Japanese-American Relations
158. Negotiations to Return American Missionaries to the United States Continue
In spite of the fact that on July 19, 1941 Ambassador Nomura had suggested the discontinuance of negotiations regarding the thirteen American missionaries in Korea, he wired on August 8, 1941 that, if Japanese government officials would permit, the Missionary Society was ready to return its representatives to the United States on furlough. He asked that this information be conveyed to the office of the Governor-General of Seoul, Capital of Chosen, for appropriate action.[593]
159. Japan Fears American and British Alliance with Russia[594]
Since Great Britain and America had already frozen Japanese funds and effected other retaliatory measures because of Japan's aggression into French Indo-China, the Japanese Military Attache in Washington warned his government, on August 9, 1941, that both these countries would take further action if Tokyo attempted to invade Siam. At the present time there were rumors of a meeting between President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill on the Atlantic. It seemed evident by this increased British-American cooperation in Far Eastern affairs that once Japan entered Siam it would face war with the two allies.[595]
By strengthening its defenses in the Alaskan Aleutians the United States had also given clear indication of its growing interest in Russia. If Japan made any move to invade Siberia by force, American aid to Russia would not only increase, but economic and diplomatic relations between the United States and Japan would be completely severed. Even if war did not result, the Japanese Military Attache was certain that at least a severe commercial war would be waged by the United States against Japan.[596]
In view of this situation, the Japanese Military Attache, on August 9, 1941, suggested that Japan delay any northern advance until Russia's defeat by Germany. Once the Russo-German war was concluded, he felt certain that America's hostility toward Japan would lessen. On the other hand, there was always the possibility that the Russo-German war would be long and that as a result Great Britain, America and Russia would attempt to encircle and destroy Japan. In taking this possibility into consideration, the Japanese Military Attache warned that Tokyo should make preparations for dealing with even the most disadvantageous contingencies.[597] He explained that the reason American tankers were being sent to Russia by way of Vladivostok was because America had experienced great difficulty in finding another route by which to send aid. There were some indications that in the future American tankers would detour via Nikolaevsk.[598]
160. Inventory of Secret Funds in Japanese Legations
On August 11, 1941 the Japanese Ambassador in Washington transmitted an itemized account of special secret funds on hand in the Japanese Legations in the United States. Ap-
[593] III, 365.
[594] Information in this section did not become available until May, 1945.
[595] III, 366.
[596] Ibid.
[597] III, 367.
[598] III, 368. These messages were not translated until January and May 1945, respectively.
[133]
proximately $17,425 was contained in a secret fund for propaganda and intelligence purposes, and $20,556 was being held in a special fund in the name of the councilor. In the secret fund in San Francisco was $5,000, while the amounts on deposit in San Francisco and New York were $47,000 and $54,606 respectively.[599]
161. New Military Attache Appointed to Japanese Embassy
Meanwhile, on August 12, 1941 Foreign Minister Teijiro Toyoda in Tokyo informed Ambassador Nomura that Supply Officers Colonel Kenkichi Shinjo, Major Kita Yoshioka and Hinkai Ko had been appointed as assistant military attaches to the Legation in Washington. The United States government was to be informed of these appointments.[600]
162. Tokyo Reports Chinese Attempt to Draw United States into War against Japan
A strange situation was reported on August 13, 1941 in a dispatch retransmitted by Tokyo from Peking to Washington. According to the message, the Chungking faction in the North China area had ordered the assassination of American citizens in the hope that this would provoke the United States into entering the war. Since the Japanese militia in this area, the Harada Corps, had been forewarned, every precaution was now being taken to guard against any such mishap.
In spite of these precautions, threatening notes in the form of handbills had been scattered near the entrances of Christian Churches operated by Americans in Kaifeng, and five persons had broken into the Baptist Church threatening Americans with pistols and making away with cameras, papers and other such articles. Although the Harada Corps was investigating these incidents and was offering protection to all Americans in its jurisdiction, it was feared that in actuality the Americans were making preparations to evacuate the North China area.[601]
Furthermore, many cases of interference with American rights and interests in Japan and Japanese occupied areas of China had been reported. On August 13, 1941 Ambassador Nomura had submitted information to Tokyo from the State Department that Japanese authorities had undertaken widespread arbitrary activities against American official establishments. In North China, the travel of Americans, including American consular officials, was being stopped, restricted, or delayed. At Peitaiho, the transportation of baggage of Americans to the railway station was forbidden and the railway refused to receive baggage for checking. In Japan proper the travel of American citizens had been restricted so that Americans had been unable to obtain accommodations to Shanghai in returning to the United States.[602]
Other infringements upon the rights of American citizens and upon American institutions were reported from Tsingtao, Hwanghsien, Shantung, Tientsin, Foochow, Hsinan and Kobe. Such treatment of American diplomatic and consular officials, as well as American business representatives, at the hands of Japanese authorities or Japanese sponsored organizations was, in each case, seemingly without provocation. Unwarranted interference, rigid restrictions and control over the movements and activities of Americans were also reported at Swatow, Mukden, Fushun and Dairen. In one instance, the American Catholic Mission Sisters were permitted to visit the Consulate for passport services only on the condition that they would guarantee to return to Fushun the same day. Furthermore, when the Consul at Mukden had attempted to telephone to the Consul at Dairen, he was informed that he had "better cancel the call".[603]
[599] III, 369.
[600] III, 370.
[601] III, 371.
[602] III, 372.
[603] III, Ibid.
[134]
THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
163. Mr. Malcolm Lovell Offers to Mediate between Japan and China
Ambassador Nomura reported on August 13, 1941 that the German Charge d'affaires, Mr. Thomsen, had called on Mr. Sadao Iguchi to request that the latter meet Mr. Malcolm Lovell, a New York banker, who was a close friend of Mr. Kuo Tai Chi, Chief of the Foreign Section of the Chungking government.[604] Mr. Thomsen had become acquainted with Mr. Lovell when the banker, who was interested in the relief work of the Quakers, had come to discuss Quaker activities in occupied France.
At the meeting of Mr. Iguchi and Mr. Lovell on August 13, 1941 Mr. Lovell spoke of his great friendship with Mr. Kuo Tai Chi ever since his college days, and discussed his interest as a Quaker in achieving peace. At the time Mr. Kuo Tai Chi had passed through the United States en route to his home from England, he had informed Mr. Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire Lovell that peace between Japan and China would be welcomed under certain conditions.[605]
According to Mr. Kuo Tai Chi, a previous Japanese peace feeler had not reached the important authorities in the Chungking government. Since Mr. Lovell's Quaker background made him exceedingly anxious to bring about peace, and because of his very close relations with Mr. Kuo Tai Chi, he asked that he be advised as to the Japanese attitude concerning this matter.
When Mr. Iguchi asked when Mr. Lovell expected to get to Chungking, the banker replied that he had many friends in New York newspaper circles and he was confident of his ability to obtain a permit from the State Department as a special correspondent of one of these papers. He would then establish contact with the Japanese at some point, such as Hongkong. Though he was conscious that considerable difficulty would be encountered in finding terms acceptable to both sides, he felt confident that he could convey the respective opinions of the Japanese authorities and Chungking authorities to each other. Furthermore, if he failed, Japan would not be affected, since he was operating entirely on his own and had no intention of accepting any expenses.
Ambassador Nomura requested Foreign Minister Toyoda to decide whether or not the services of Mr. Lovell could be used, stating that Mr. Thomsen believed him to be a thoroughly reliable character.[606]
164. Japanese Foreign Office Asserts Its Authority in Foreign Relations
On August 15, 1941 Foreign Minister Toyoda instructed Ambassador Nomura that all questions regarding the resuming of sending Japanese ships to the United States should be dealt with by the Japanese Ambassador in Washington, or the Consul General in New York. These instructions were occasioned by a message from Financial Attache Tsutumu Nishiyama to the Minister of Finance in Tokyo.
The Foreign Office was concerned not only with the question of jurisdiction in such matters, but also disturbed because a message had not been sent in an Embassy code, which was a violation of their security instructions.[607]
165. Ambassador Nomura Suggests Suspension of Funds Pending Settlement of Financial Agreement
Proposing to pay Legation salaries out of cash on hand, Ambassador Nomura suggested on August 14, 1941 that remittances from Japan be temporarily postponed. Until such time as a general agreement was concluded between the United States and Japan, it would be impos-
[604] III, 373.
[605] Ibid.
[606] Ibid.
[607] III, 374.
[135]
sible to draw from government funds or to pay the salaries which were remitted from Japan. To discuss this financial situation with the Yokohama Specie Bank, Ambassador Nomura sent Mr. Hirome Hoside to New York.[608]
It will be remembered that the United States extended every facility to the Japanese diplomatic and consular organizations, assuring them permission to draw funds for the maintenance of their offices and for the subsistence and traveling expenses of their personnel.[609]
166. Freezing Order Curtails Japanese-American Trade
Foreseeing no way to make payment for the shipments of oil which Japan badly needed at this time, the Japanese Ambassador advised the exchange of raw silk for oil. It would be fine, he said, if Japan could find a way to make the freezing order ineffective, but it could neither expect much in this direction nor hope that the United States would apply frozen funds to pay for the oil.[610]
167. Ambassador Nomura Reports Indirect Participation of United States in the War Against Germany
As further proof that the United States was indirectly, if not directly, participating in the war on the side of the Allies, Mr. Nomura cited the statement made by the New York Times to the effect that if there were any indications that Soviet Russia was being defeated, the aircraft supplied to Russia should be stopped, since such material might fall eventually into German hands, that not even British and American military observers were permitted to watch the war, and as a result, a true picture of the German-Russian war could not be obtained.[611]
168. Japan Plans to Evacuate Nationals from the United States
Discussions were now being carried on between Japanese officials in American cities and in Mexico in regard to the evacuation of Japanese nationals in this area. Consul Yoshio Muto at San Francisco, in a circular dispatch transmitted August 16, 1941, said that first-generation Japanese who had established themselves in America and second-generation Japanese who had registered for military service were anxious to remain in the United States should a break in Japanese-American relations occur.
Consul Muto added that no indications of unrest were apparent even when such persons heard that Japanese ships on regular schedule were no longer to operate to the west coast. Since many first and second-generation Japanese were actually wavering in their intentions, the Japanese consulate at San Francisco was encouraging these persons through subsidized newspapers and organizations.
All Japanese persons connected with banks and companies with home offices in Japan, as well as others who were employed only in completing unfinished business, would be evacuated. It was imagined, Mr. Muto said, that Japanese residents who had become attached to the land would be dealt quite a blow when such evacuation took place. Therefore, all possible means were being taken to soften the blow.[612]
169. American Officials Search Japanese Business Offices in Los Angeles
An inspection of the NYK, Yokohama Specie Bank, the Sumitomo, the Mitsui, and the Mitsubishi branch offices in Los Angeles by four to seven Treasury Department and FBI officials was reported to Tokyo on August 18, 1941. A thorough and detailed inspection had been
[608] III, 375.
[609] III, 376.
[610] III, 377.
[611] III, 378.
[612] III, 379.
[136]
THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
made in each office. Not only had the inspectors checked letters of private individuals, but photostatic copies had been made of several thousand documents, although the Sumitomo office had forbidden the photostating of its codes.[613]
Consul Kenji Nakauchi believed that the investigation had been conducted to determine the existence of "subversive acts" in spite of the fact that it was theoretically conducted in conjunction with the freezing order. Official employees of the Yokohama Specie office had been forbidden to enter their offices, or to leave, between 6:00 P.M. and 8:30 A.M. in order to prevent the burning of documents. It had been necessary, Consul Nakauchi disclosed, to secure the approval of the inspectors on all telegraphic communications received or dispatched.[614]
170. Evacuation Committee Meets on August 18, 1941 to Discuss Return of Missionaries
In answer to Ambassador Nomura's dispatch of August 8, 1941, Tokyo communicated a message from the Governor-General of Korea on August 19, 1941 to the effect that the evacuation committee of the Mission in Keijo had met on August 18, 1941 to determine whether the missionaries were to return to America. The Governor-General in Korea promised to keep Foreign Minister Toyoda informed as to the results of the meeting of the evacuation committee.[615]
171. The Japanese Embassy in Washington Reprimands the Tokyo Foreign Office
On August 19, 1941 Japanese representatives in Washington complained that during the past several years the Foreign Office had sent general instructions which did not take into consideration the general world situation and, therefore, missed the most essential points. It was suggested, therefore, that diplomatic matters be turned over to the investigation section for proper classification according to their importance so that the Embassy could dispose of the matters in the order of their urgency.[616]
172. Japan Recognizes Russo-German War as Threat to Its Border
On August 20, 1941 Tokyo replied to Ambassador Nomura's request for information concerning Japan's attitude toward the Russo-German war. While Tokyo did not feel able to predict the outcome of the Russo-German war, it took into consideration the possibility that Soviet Russia might lose the war with the result that the Stalin regime would disintegrate and far eastern Russia be thrown into political confusion.[617]
Moreover, it was necessary to consider that since part of Soviet Russia was adjacent to Japan and Manchukuo, Japan felt the necessity of taking precautionary measures to safeguard its national defense and security. There also remained the possibility of Soviet Russia's being influenced by a third power and consequently permitting the establishment of military bases in the maritime provinces of Siberia or in Kanchataka.
As a result, the Japanese government had decided to increase its forces in Manchukuo, and at the same time, to carry on negotiations in Tokyo with Russian officials in order to solve the various questions pertaining to this area. Tokyo was aware, however, that Russian officials had been warned to be cautious in their attitude toward the forces situated in Manchukuo.[618]
If this increase of Japanese troops in northern China should bring from the United States further demands for explanation by Japan, Ambassador Nomura was advised to impress upon
[613] III, 380.
[614] III, 381.
[615] III, 382.
[616] III, 383.
[617] III, 384. See Section 23, Part A, Rumors Of a British-American-Russian Peace Conference Speed Japanese Action.
[618] Ibid.
[137]
the American government that the troop movement was purely a precautionary measure designed to forestall any unforeseen emergency which would disturb peace in the Far East. To an inquiry from the Russian Ambassador in Tokyo regarding this matter the Japanese Foreign Minister had assured the Russian government that Japan would live up to the Neutrality Pact "as long as Russia did". The Soviet Ambassador was satisfied with this reply.[619]
The Tokyo Foreign Office also requested Ambassador Nomura to call the attention of the United States' authorities to the fact that shipping war materials from the United States to Russia by way of Japanese coastal waters would have an unfavorable effect on the already unstable Japanese-American relations. The Japanese Foreign Minister had already explained the situation to Ambassador Joseph C. Grew in Tokyo.[620]
173. Consul Morishima Suggests Further Precautions to Ensure Secrecy of Dispatches
Asking that the Japanese Ambassador in Washington investigate the telegraphic situation, Consul Morito Morishima in New York protested that the Western Union Telegraph Company had returned one of his dispatches which had been sent to Vancouver. Furthermore, since code messages from the Consulate apparently had been prohibited, requests for transmissions must have been received from Japanese Consulates in Canada.[621]
174. Change Predicted in Japanese American Relations
The Japanese finance officer, Mr. Nishiyama, in a confidential interview on August 21, 1941, was told to expect a change in Japanese-American relations within the next ten days. This change would depend upon the attitude that Japan took during this time.[626]
175. Washington Warns Tokyo of Security Violation
Since Tokyo had requested information regarding American treatment of Japanese officials in connection with all branches of communications, asset freezing, travel and surveillance of diplomatic and consular officers, Ambassador Nomura disseminated the instructions of the Foreign Office as directed. However, as a precautionary measure, he first carefully paraphrased and then encoded these instructions. On August 22, 1941 Ambassador Nomura warned Tokyo that a close watch should be maintained in guarding code secrecy.[627]
177. Japanese Authorities Express Concern over United States' Official Inspection
On August 23, 1941 Financial Attache Tsutumu Nishiyama in Tokyo wired his opinion regarding the bank inspection conducted by the Treasury Department officials and F.B.I. men. He believed that the American inspection came closer to being a search for "subversive acts" rather than an inspection connected with the freezing order.
Influential persons in the Specie Bank, greatly concerned, asked that an investigation be conducted to ascertain the real purpose of the inspection of American officials.[629]
178. Japan Reports Anti-Japanese Activities among American Missionaries in China
A supplementary report on American missionaries in China was sent to Washington by Tokyo on August 25, 1941. Upon investigation, the Japanese professed to have learned that the Church had taken in sixteen wounded enemy troops, many enemy spies and Communists, and had hid them on the church premises. It was further alleged that church officials were
[619] III, 385.
[620] Ibid.
[621] III, 386.
[626] III, 391.
[627] III, 392.
[629] III, 394.
[138]
THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
sending undercover reports to the enemy and were participating in enemy-like activities. As a result of these findings, nine persons, including missionaries, were confined in a house adjoining the church hospital and kept under surveillance.
Deciding, in view of the critical times, to act with special leniency, the Japanese military command asked Mr. James N. Montgomery, who was responsible for the Americans, to sign a pledge that the Americans would not take part in any similar activities in the future. Consequently, the American citizens were released and the watch removed.[630]
In spite of this expression of Japanese friendliness, the church officials were circulating rumors to the effect that a certain Chinese patient who had died of illness in the hospital, had been murdered by the Japanese.[631]
179. Japan Attempts Disposal of Certain Frozen Funds
On August 25, 1941 the Chief of the Financial Bureau in Tokyo replied to Finance Attache Nishiyama's query concerning United States bonds in Japanese banks in the United States. If turned over secretly to the Japanese Financial Attache, Ambassador or Consul, Tokyo believed that those bonds of which the United States was unaware, could be easily disposed of without the owner's loss of title. When such a method was used, the Japanese official to whom they were entrusted was to issue a receipt giving all the information necessary to identify them. A certified list of these bonds was then to be sent to the Finance Minister in Japan who would in turn make yen payments on principal and interest.
In order to prevent the United States' officials from learning of this plan, deliveries of such certified lists were to be made by Foreign Office couriers. On the other hand, those bonds known to United States officials necessarily would be frozen. No other course could be pursued in such a case since any minor incident at this time could considerably endanger any Japanese-American negotiations.[632]
180. Japan Learns Details of Churchill-Roosevelt Agreement
A report of the Russian Peoples Commissar for Foreign Affairs which had been sent to various Russian representatives in the Orient was authorized by the Japanese government on August 25, 1941. It discussed the terms agreed upon during the present Roosevelt-Churchill conference, and said that in order to ensure the support of American public opinion in sending aid to Great Britain, President Roosevelt had stated that British war aims must be clarified. Churchill had cited the exhaustion and the anti-war sentiment prevalent in British dominions and among the laboring classes, and for these reasons had requested positive aid from America.
America had promised aid in the event of a Japanese attack upon Australia, Burma or the Netherlands East Indies and had agreed to an expansion of the economic war against Japan. American aid was also guaranteed in the Near East in case Germany invaded the Caucasus. Furthermore, the United States extended to Great Britain a grant for military aid and promised American participation against German submarine warfare.[633]
181. American Newspapermen in Italy Forecast Axis Defeat
Word came to the Japanese Embassy in Washington on August 25, 1941 that American newspapermen in Rome were highly pleased with developments in the international situation. They believed that American aid to Britain and Russia would gradually strengthen the en-
[630] III, 395.
[631] Ibid.
[632] III, 396.
[633] III, 397.
[139]
circlement of the European continent, and that the German and Italian armies in North Africa would be cut off from their home countries. They also believed that American aid in the future would be sent by way of Dakar, Bathurst, British Gambia, Basra, Singapore and the Suez.[634]
182. Minister Sakaya Criticizes American Aid to Russia
A report to Tokyo from Minister Tadashi Sakaya concerning a conversation with Hans Frederick Schoenfield, the American Minister in Helsinki, Finland was relayed to Ambassador Nomura in Washington. According to the report, Minister Sakaya had argued that the United States' support of Russia, a country diametrically opposed to the democratic principle, was peculiar.[635]
The American Minister replied that, although he had received no detailed reports from Washington, he imagined that his country considered it essential to support Russia against a greater threat. Furthermore, from the standpoint of the United States, Bolshevism could not constitute a very great threat to other nations because of the tribulation which Russia had suffered in the last ten years.[636]
183. Minister Schoenfield Clarifies American Policy
In answer to a remark concerning the absurdity of the United States' meddling in the affairs of Europe and Asia while adhering to the policy of the Monroe Doctrine, Minister Sakaya was informed by Mr. Schoenfield that though foreign countries were not permitted to seize control of any part of the American continents, the United States did not wish to control any country therein. However, should Germany attempt to contravene the principle of self-determination, which would shatter the foundations of peace between the old and new worlds and upset the economic equilibrium, the United States intended to prevent such action.[637]
The American Minister added that the bad relations between the United States and Japan would probably soon improve and that, as long as the leaders of the two countries continued to negotiate, there was a good chance for a composure of relations between the two countries.[638]
184. Japan Inquires About American Treatment of Japanese Nationals
As relations between Japan and the United States grew steadily worse, Tokyo asked Washington for a report on the methods used by the United States in handling Japanese nationals, since it intended to draw up a reply to an American protest against Japan's control of foreign business in Tokyo.
On August 26, 1941, Mr. Kenji Nakauchi, of the Japanese office in Hollywood, replied that printed matter sent from Japan apparently was being censored, although there was no actual proof. Private individuals in the United States often found that newspapers and magazines from Japan had been delayed or confiscated entirely. In one instance photostatic copies had been made of Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire a Japanese official's private letters and diary.
After the Tachibana Incident, Japanese naval officials had been trailed and kept under surveillance, and since that time other Japanese nationals connected with the army and navy also had been watched. In spite of the fact that Captain Yutaka Ishikawa and Commander Sasaki of the Japanese navy had been subjected to an examination by customs officials before boarding the Otowasan Maru to return home, the FBI had also rigorously examined these officers.[639]
[634] III, 398.
[635] III, 399.
[636] Ibid.
[637] III, 400.
[638] III, 401.
[639] III, 402.
Furthermore, reports were to be made on warships and aircraft carriers at anchor, and although not so important, those tied up at wharves, buoys, and in docks. The types and classes of vessels were to be designated briefly and special mention was to be made when two or more vessels were alongside the same wharf.[584] Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire
On September 29, 1941 the details of a special code to be used in referring to the location of American warships in Pearl Harbor was sent to Tokyo through diplomatic channels. "KS" meant the repair dock in the Navy yard; "FV" was the moorings in the vicinity of Ford Island; "FG" designated the location alongside Ford Island; and "A" and "B" indicated east and west sides of "FG" respectively.[585]
151. Japanese Report on American Transportation of English Troops
Consul Nagao Kita, on October 2, 1941, reported that an American steamship, possibly the Monterey from Australia, had entered port bearing approximately 600 Australians and New Zealand air corps troops under the command of Wing Commander Axel Richards. English language newspapermen stated that this was the first instance of an American ship being used to transport English troops.[586]
(e) Reports from South America
152. Japanese Interest in Brazilian Air Fields
The Japanese Foreign Minister, in a dispatch to Rio de Janeiro on September 29, 1941, asked that plans for landing fields on islands near Brazil be investigated and the information be sent to Tokyo at once.[587]
153. Minister Ishii Reports American Planes Arriving in Brazil
Japanese Minister Itaro Ishii in Rio de Janeiro informed Ambassador Nomura in Washington that the United States was dispatching weekly two large planes, each capable of carrying 62 persons, to Bathhurst in British Gambia. According to information gathered by Consul Ishii, plans were being made to dispatch by plane several thousand technicians, possibly including military officers.[588]
(f) Reports from Capetown, South Africa
154. Japanese Agents Reports the Transportation of British Soldiers
Two Japanese naval intelligence dispatches from Capetown, South Africa to Tokyo contained information concerning British vessels entering that port, and accordingly were retransmitted to Berlin. Approximately 8,000 British soldiers whose destination appeared to be Iran were embarked on five large transports, accompanied by a 7,000- or 8,000-ton cruiser, which had entered port on September 11, 1941 and sailed again September 14.
155. Japan Watches British Shipping Near Cape of Good Hope
As an aid to Russia, Britain was dispatching airplanes to the Eastern Front, along with aviators, extra machinery parts, gasoline, repair materials and technicians. Some of those were being transported via the White Sea and Murmansk, and part were being sent by the Cape route via Iran.[589]
[584] III, 356.
[585] III, 357.
[586] III, 358.
[587] III, 359.
[588] III, 360.
[589] III, 361.
[131]
Between September 16 and 21, 1941 seven British vessels were reported by Japanese spies to have entered Capetown for two-day stopovers. A camouflaged cruiser, on which a number of soldiers had embarked, and which appeared to be headed for Iran, entered port on September 18, and sailed on September 20, 1941.[590]
(g) Reports from Vladivostok, Russia
156. Departure of Russian Submarines
From Japanese diplomats in Vladivostok, came a ship movement report on September 4, 1941. It revealed that most of the Russian submarines seemed to have gone to sea, though their minesweepers were still engaging in strenuous daily practice. Detailed descriptions of the ships in the harbor and the arrival of a United States tanker on September 3, 1941 were reported.[591]
157. Japanese Learn of British Supply Route to Russia
On October 15, 1941 Japanese intelligence reports revealed that a tremendous amount of British supplies was being shipped to Russia through Capetown, Durban and Lourenco Marques. Aid to Russia via Iran had become difficult owing to a lack of docking facilities in the Persian Gulf, and because of poorly operated railroads in Iran. For this reason Russia and Great Britain had decided to appoint Brigadier General Sir Godfrey Dean Rhodes, then Director of Railways and Harbors in British Kenyauganda, to the position of Director of Transportation in Iran.[592]
[590] III, 362.
[591] III, 363.
[592] III, 364.
[132]
THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
PART C—JAPANESE DIPLOMATIC ACTIVITIES THROUGHOUT THE WORLD
(a) Japanese-American Relations
158. Negotiations to Return American Missionaries to the United States Continue
In spite of the fact that on July 19, 1941 Ambassador Nomura had suggested the discontinuance of negotiations regarding the thirteen American missionaries in Korea, he wired on August 8, 1941 that, if Japanese government officials would permit, the Missionary Society was ready to return its representatives to the United States on furlough. He asked that this information be conveyed to the office of the Governor-General of Seoul, Capital of Chosen, for appropriate action.[593]
159. Japan Fears American and British Alliance with Russia[594]
Since Great Britain and America had already frozen Japanese funds and effected other retaliatory measures because of Japan's aggression into French Indo-China, the Japanese Military Attache in Washington warned his government, on August 9, 1941, that both these countries would take further action if Tokyo attempted to invade Siam. At the present time there were rumors of a meeting between President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill on the Atlantic. It seemed evident by this increased British-American cooperation in Far Eastern affairs that once Japan entered Siam it would face war with the two allies.[595]
By strengthening its defenses in the Alaskan Aleutians the United States had also given clear indication of its growing interest in Russia. If Japan made any move to invade Siberia by force, American aid to Russia would not only increase, but economic and diplomatic relations between the United States and Japan would be completely severed. Even if war did not result, the Japanese Military Attache was certain that at least a severe commercial war would be waged by the United States against Japan.[596]
In view of this situation, the Japanese Military Attache, on August 9, 1941, suggested that Japan delay any northern advance until Russia's defeat by Germany. Once the Russo-German war was concluded, he felt certain that America's hostility toward Japan would lessen. On the other hand, there was always the possibility that the Russo-German war would be long and that as a result Great Britain, America and Russia would attempt to encircle and destroy Japan. In taking this possibility into consideration, the Japanese Military Attache warned that Tokyo should make preparations for dealing with even the most disadvantageous contingencies.[597] He explained that the reason American tankers were being sent to Russia by way of Vladivostok was because America had experienced great difficulty in finding another route by which to send aid. There were some indications that in the future American tankers would detour via Nikolaevsk.[598]
160. Inventory of Secret Funds in Japanese Legations
On August 11, 1941 the Japanese Ambassador in Washington transmitted an itemized account of special secret funds on hand in the Japanese Legations in the United States. Ap-
[593] III, 365.
[594] Information in this section did not become available until May, 1945.
[595] III, 366.
[596] Ibid.
[597] III, 367.
[598] III, 368. These messages were not translated until January and May 1945, respectively.
[133]
proximately $17,425 was contained in a secret fund for propaganda and intelligence purposes, and $20,556 was being held in a special fund in the name of the councilor. In the secret fund in San Francisco was $5,000, while the amounts on deposit in San Francisco and New York were $47,000 and $54,606 respectively.[599]
161. New Military Attache Appointed to Japanese Embassy
Meanwhile, on August 12, 1941 Foreign Minister Teijiro Toyoda in Tokyo informed Ambassador Nomura that Supply Officers Colonel Kenkichi Shinjo, Major Kita Yoshioka and Hinkai Ko had been appointed as assistant military attaches to the Legation in Washington. The United States government was to be informed of these appointments.[600]
162. Tokyo Reports Chinese Attempt to Draw United States into War against Japan
A strange situation was reported on August 13, 1941 in a dispatch retransmitted by Tokyo from Peking to Washington. According to the message, the Chungking faction in the North China area had ordered the assassination of American citizens in the hope that this would provoke the United States into entering the war. Since the Japanese militia in this area, the Harada Corps, had been forewarned, every precaution was now being taken to guard against any such mishap.
In spite of these precautions, threatening notes in the form of handbills had been scattered near the entrances of Christian Churches operated by Americans in Kaifeng, and five persons had broken into the Baptist Church threatening Americans with pistols and making away with cameras, papers and other such articles. Although the Harada Corps was investigating these incidents and was offering protection to all Americans in its jurisdiction, it was feared that in actuality the Americans were making preparations to evacuate the North China area.[601]
Furthermore, many cases of interference with American rights and interests in Japan and Japanese occupied areas of China had been reported. On August 13, 1941 Ambassador Nomura had submitted information to Tokyo from the State Department that Japanese authorities had undertaken widespread arbitrary activities against American official establishments. In North China, the travel of Americans, including American consular officials, was being stopped, restricted, or delayed. At Peitaiho, the transportation of baggage of Americans to the railway station was forbidden and the railway refused to receive baggage for checking. In Japan proper the travel of American citizens had been restricted so that Americans had been unable to obtain accommodations to Shanghai in returning to the United States.[602]
Other infringements upon the rights of American citizens and upon American institutions were reported from Tsingtao, Hwanghsien, Shantung, Tientsin, Foochow, Hsinan and Kobe. Such treatment of American diplomatic and consular officials, as well as American business representatives, at the hands of Japanese authorities or Japanese sponsored organizations was, in each case, seemingly without provocation. Unwarranted interference, rigid restrictions and control over the movements and activities of Americans were also reported at Swatow, Mukden, Fushun and Dairen. In one instance, the American Catholic Mission Sisters were permitted to visit the Consulate for passport services only on the condition that they would guarantee to return to Fushun the same day. Furthermore, when the Consul at Mukden had attempted to telephone to the Consul at Dairen, he was informed that he had "better cancel the call".[603]
[599] III, 369.
[600] III, 370.
[601] III, 371.
[602] III, 372.
[603] III, Ibid.
[134]
THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
163. Mr. Malcolm Lovell Offers to Mediate between Japan and China
Ambassador Nomura reported on August 13, 1941 that the German Charge d'affaires, Mr. Thomsen, had called on Mr. Sadao Iguchi to request that the latter meet Mr. Malcolm Lovell, a New York banker, who was a close friend of Mr. Kuo Tai Chi, Chief of the Foreign Section of the Chungking government.[604] Mr. Thomsen had become acquainted with Mr. Lovell when the banker, who was interested in the relief work of the Quakers, had come to discuss Quaker activities in occupied France.
At the meeting of Mr. Iguchi and Mr. Lovell on August 13, 1941 Mr. Lovell spoke of his great friendship with Mr. Kuo Tai Chi ever since his college days, and discussed his interest as a Quaker in achieving peace. At the time Mr. Kuo Tai Chi had passed through the United States en route to his home from England, he had informed Mr. Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire Lovell that peace between Japan and China would be welcomed under certain conditions.[605]
According to Mr. Kuo Tai Chi, a previous Japanese peace feeler had not reached the important authorities in the Chungking government. Since Mr. Lovell's Quaker background made him exceedingly anxious to bring about peace, and because of his very close relations with Mr. Kuo Tai Chi, he asked that he be advised as to the Japanese attitude concerning this matter.
When Mr. Iguchi asked when Mr. Lovell expected to get to Chungking, the banker replied that he had many friends in New York newspaper circles and he was confident of his ability to obtain a permit from the State Department as a special correspondent of one of these papers. He would then establish contact with the Japanese at some point, such as Hongkong. Though he was conscious that considerable difficulty would be encountered in finding terms acceptable to both sides, he felt confident that he could convey the respective opinions of the Japanese authorities and Chungking authorities to each other. Furthermore, if he failed, Japan would not be affected, since he was operating entirely on his own and had no intention of accepting any expenses.
Ambassador Nomura requested Foreign Minister Toyoda to decide whether or not the services of Mr. Lovell could be used, stating that Mr. Thomsen believed him to be a thoroughly reliable character.[606]
164. Japanese Foreign Office Asserts Its Authority in Foreign Relations
On August 15, 1941 Foreign Minister Toyoda instructed Ambassador Nomura that all questions regarding the resuming of sending Japanese ships to the United States should be dealt with by the Japanese Ambassador in Washington, or the Consul General in New York. These instructions were occasioned by a message from Financial Attache Tsutumu Nishiyama to the Minister of Finance in Tokyo.
The Foreign Office was concerned not only with the question of jurisdiction in such matters, but also disturbed because a message had not been sent in an Embassy code, which was a violation of their security instructions.[607]
165. Ambassador Nomura Suggests Suspension of Funds Pending Settlement of Financial Agreement
Proposing to pay Legation salaries out of cash on hand, Ambassador Nomura suggested on August 14, 1941 that remittances from Japan be temporarily postponed. Until such time as a general agreement was concluded between the United States and Japan, it would be impos-
[604] III, 373.
[605] Ibid.
[606] Ibid.
[607] III, 374.
[135]
sible to draw from government funds or to pay the salaries which were remitted from Japan. To discuss this financial situation with the Yokohama Specie Bank, Ambassador Nomura sent Mr. Hirome Hoside to New York.[608]
It will be remembered that the United States extended every facility to the Japanese diplomatic and consular organizations, assuring them permission to draw funds for the maintenance of their offices and for the subsistence and traveling expenses of their personnel.[609]
166. Freezing Order Curtails Japanese-American Trade
Foreseeing no way to make payment for the shipments of oil which Japan badly needed at this time, the Japanese Ambassador advised the exchange of raw silk for oil. It would be fine, he said, if Japan could find a way to make the freezing order ineffective, but it could neither expect much in this direction nor hope that the United States would apply frozen funds to pay for the oil.[610]
167. Ambassador Nomura Reports Indirect Participation of United States in the War Against Germany
As further proof that the United States was indirectly, if not directly, participating in the war on the side of the Allies, Mr. Nomura cited the statement made by the New York Times to the effect that if there were any indications that Soviet Russia was being defeated, the aircraft supplied to Russia should be stopped, since such material might fall eventually into German hands, that not even British and American military observers were permitted to watch the war, and as a result, a true picture of the German-Russian war could not be obtained.[611]
168. Japan Plans to Evacuate Nationals from the United States
Discussions were now being carried on between Japanese officials in American cities and in Mexico in regard to the evacuation of Japanese nationals in this area. Consul Yoshio Muto at San Francisco, in a circular dispatch transmitted August 16, 1941, said that first-generation Japanese who had established themselves in America and second-generation Japanese who had registered for military service were anxious to remain in the United States should a break in Japanese-American relations occur.
Consul Muto added that no indications of unrest were apparent even when such persons heard that Japanese ships on regular schedule were no longer to operate to the west coast. Since many first and second-generation Japanese were actually wavering in their intentions, the Japanese consulate at San Francisco was encouraging these persons through subsidized newspapers and organizations.
All Japanese persons connected with banks and companies with home offices in Japan, as well as others who were employed only in completing unfinished business, would be evacuated. It was imagined, Mr. Muto said, that Japanese residents who had become attached to the land would be dealt quite a blow when such evacuation took place. Therefore, all possible means were being taken to soften the blow.[612]
169. American Officials Search Japanese Business Offices in Los Angeles
An inspection of the NYK, Yokohama Specie Bank, the Sumitomo, the Mitsui, and the Mitsubishi branch offices in Los Angeles by four to seven Treasury Department and FBI officials was reported to Tokyo on August 18, 1941. A thorough and detailed inspection had been
[608] III, 375.
[609] III, 376.
[610] III, 377.
[611] III, 378.
[612] III, 379.
[136]
THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
made in each office. Not only had the inspectors checked letters of private individuals, but photostatic copies had been made of several thousand documents, although the Sumitomo office had forbidden the photostating of its codes.[613]
Consul Kenji Nakauchi believed that the investigation had been conducted to determine the existence of "subversive acts" in spite of the fact that it was theoretically conducted in conjunction with the freezing order. Official employees of the Yokohama Specie office had been forbidden to enter their offices, or to leave, between 6:00 P.M. and 8:30 A.M. in order to prevent the burning of documents. It had been necessary, Consul Nakauchi disclosed, to secure the approval of the inspectors on all telegraphic communications received or dispatched.[614]
170. Evacuation Committee Meets on August 18, 1941 to Discuss Return of Missionaries
In answer to Ambassador Nomura's dispatch of August 8, 1941, Tokyo communicated a message from the Governor-General of Korea on August 19, 1941 to the effect that the evacuation committee of the Mission in Keijo had met on August 18, 1941 to determine whether the missionaries were to return to America. The Governor-General in Korea promised to keep Foreign Minister Toyoda informed as to the results of the meeting of the evacuation committee.[615]
171. The Japanese Embassy in Washington Reprimands the Tokyo Foreign Office
On August 19, 1941 Japanese representatives in Washington complained that during the past several years the Foreign Office had sent general instructions which did not take into consideration the general world situation and, therefore, missed the most essential points. It was suggested, therefore, that diplomatic matters be turned over to the investigation section for proper classification according to their importance so that the Embassy could dispose of the matters in the order of their urgency.[616]
172. Japan Recognizes Russo-German War as Threat to Its Border
On August 20, 1941 Tokyo replied to Ambassador Nomura's request for information concerning Japan's attitude toward the Russo-German war. While Tokyo did not feel able to predict the outcome of the Russo-German war, it took into consideration the possibility that Soviet Russia might lose the war with the result that the Stalin regime would disintegrate and far eastern Russia be thrown into political confusion.[617]
Moreover, it was necessary to consider that since part of Soviet Russia was adjacent to Japan and Manchukuo, Japan felt the necessity of taking precautionary measures to safeguard its national defense and security. There also remained the possibility of Soviet Russia's being influenced by a third power and consequently permitting the establishment of military bases in the maritime provinces of Siberia or in Kanchataka.
As a result, the Japanese government had decided to increase its forces in Manchukuo, and at the same time, to carry on negotiations in Tokyo with Russian officials in order to solve the various questions pertaining to this area. Tokyo was aware, however, that Russian officials had been warned to be cautious in their attitude toward the forces situated in Manchukuo.[618]
If this increase of Japanese troops in northern China should bring from the United States further demands for explanation by Japan, Ambassador Nomura was advised to impress upon
[613] III, 380.
[614] III, 381.
[615] III, 382.
[616] III, 383.
[617] III, 384. See Section 23, Part A, Rumors Of a British-American-Russian Peace Conference Speed Japanese Action.
[618] Ibid.
[137]
the American government that the troop movement was purely a precautionary measure designed to forestall any unforeseen emergency which would disturb peace in the Far East. To an inquiry from the Russian Ambassador in Tokyo regarding this matter the Japanese Foreign Minister had assured the Russian government that Japan would live up to the Neutrality Pact "as long as Russia did". The Soviet Ambassador was satisfied with this reply.[619]
The Tokyo Foreign Office also requested Ambassador Nomura to call the attention of the United States' authorities to the fact that shipping war materials from the United States to Russia by way of Japanese coastal waters would have an unfavorable effect on the already unstable Japanese-American relations. The Japanese Foreign Minister had already explained the situation to Ambassador Joseph C. Grew in Tokyo.[620]
173. Consul Morishima Suggests Further Precautions to Ensure Secrecy of Dispatches
Asking that the Japanese Ambassador in Washington investigate the telegraphic situation, Consul Morito Morishima in New York protested that the Western Union Telegraph Company had returned one of his dispatches which had been sent to Vancouver. Furthermore, since code messages from the Consulate apparently had been prohibited, requests for transmissions must have been received from Japanese Consulates in Canada.[621]
174. Change Predicted in Japanese American Relations
The Japanese finance officer, Mr. Nishiyama, in a confidential interview on August 21, 1941, was told to expect a change in Japanese-American relations within the next ten days. This change would depend upon the attitude that Japan took during this time.[626]
175. Washington Warns Tokyo of Security Violation
Since Tokyo had requested information regarding American treatment of Japanese officials in connection with all branches of communications, asset freezing, travel and surveillance of diplomatic and consular officers, Ambassador Nomura disseminated the instructions of the Foreign Office as directed. However, as a precautionary measure, he first carefully paraphrased and then encoded these instructions. On August 22, 1941 Ambassador Nomura warned Tokyo that a close watch should be maintained in guarding code secrecy.[627]
177. Japanese Authorities Express Concern over United States' Official Inspection
On August 23, 1941 Financial Attache Tsutumu Nishiyama in Tokyo wired his opinion regarding the bank inspection conducted by the Treasury Department officials and F.B.I. men. He believed that the American inspection came closer to being a search for "subversive acts" rather than an inspection connected with the freezing order.
Influential persons in the Specie Bank, greatly concerned, asked that an investigation be conducted to ascertain the real purpose of the inspection of American officials.[629]
178. Japan Reports Anti-Japanese Activities among American Missionaries in China
A supplementary report on American missionaries in China was sent to Washington by Tokyo on August 25, 1941. Upon investigation, the Japanese professed to have learned that the Church had taken in sixteen wounded enemy troops, many enemy spies and Communists, and had hid them on the church premises. It was further alleged that church officials were
[619] III, 385.
[620] Ibid.
[621] III, 386.
[626] III, 391.
[627] III, 392.
[629] III, 394.
[138]
THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
sending undercover reports to the enemy and were participating in enemy-like activities. As a result of these findings, nine persons, including missionaries, were confined in a house adjoining the church hospital and kept under surveillance.
Deciding, in view of the critical times, to act with special leniency, the Japanese military command asked Mr. James N. Montgomery, who was responsible for the Americans, to sign a pledge that the Americans would not take part in any similar activities in the future. Consequently, the American citizens were released and the watch removed.[630]
In spite of this expression of Japanese friendliness, the church officials were circulating rumors to the effect that a certain Chinese patient who had died of illness in the hospital, had been murdered by the Japanese.[631]
179. Japan Attempts Disposal of Certain Frozen Funds
On August 25, 1941 the Chief of the Financial Bureau in Tokyo replied to Finance Attache Nishiyama's query concerning United States bonds in Japanese banks in the United States. If turned over secretly to the Japanese Financial Attache, Ambassador or Consul, Tokyo believed that those bonds of which the United States was unaware, could be easily disposed of without the owner's loss of title. When such a method was used, the Japanese official to whom they were entrusted was to issue a receipt giving all the information necessary to identify them. A certified list of these bonds was then to be sent to the Finance Minister in Japan who would in turn make yen payments on principal and interest.
In order to prevent the United States' officials from learning of this plan, deliveries of such certified lists were to be made by Foreign Office couriers. On the other hand, those bonds known to United States officials necessarily would be frozen. No other course could be pursued in such a case since any minor incident at this time could considerably endanger any Japanese-American negotiations.[632]
180. Japan Learns Details of Churchill-Roosevelt Agreement
A report of the Russian Peoples Commissar for Foreign Affairs which had been sent to various Russian representatives in the Orient was authorized by the Japanese government on August 25, 1941. It discussed the terms agreed upon during the present Roosevelt-Churchill conference, and said that in order to ensure the support of American public opinion in sending aid to Great Britain, President Roosevelt had stated that British war aims must be clarified. Churchill had cited the exhaustion and the anti-war sentiment prevalent in British dominions and among the laboring classes, and for these reasons had requested positive aid from America.
America had promised aid in the event of a Japanese attack upon Australia, Burma or the Netherlands East Indies and had agreed to an expansion of the economic war against Japan. American aid was also guaranteed in the Near East in case Germany invaded the Caucasus. Furthermore, the United States extended to Great Britain a grant for military aid and promised American participation against German submarine warfare.[633]
181. American Newspapermen in Italy Forecast Axis Defeat
Word came to the Japanese Embassy in Washington on August 25, 1941 that American newspapermen in Rome were highly pleased with developments in the international situation. They believed that American aid to Britain and Russia would gradually strengthen the en-
[630] III, 395.
[631] Ibid.
[632] III, 396.
[633] III, 397.
[139]
circlement of the European continent, and that the German and Italian armies in North Africa would be cut off from their home countries. They also believed that American aid in the future would be sent by way of Dakar, Bathurst, British Gambia, Basra, Singapore and the Suez.[634]
182. Minister Sakaya Criticizes American Aid to Russia
A report to Tokyo from Minister Tadashi Sakaya concerning a conversation with Hans Frederick Schoenfield, the American Minister in Helsinki, Finland was relayed to Ambassador Nomura in Washington. According to the report, Minister Sakaya had argued that the United States' support of Russia, a country diametrically opposed to the democratic principle, was peculiar.[635]
The American Minister replied that, although he had received no detailed reports from Washington, he imagined that his country considered it essential to support Russia against a greater threat. Furthermore, from the standpoint of the United States, Bolshevism could not constitute a very great threat to other nations because of the tribulation which Russia had suffered in the last ten years.[636]
183. Minister Schoenfield Clarifies American Policy
In answer to a remark concerning the absurdity of the United States' meddling in the affairs of Europe and Asia while adhering to the policy of the Monroe Doctrine, Minister Sakaya was informed by Mr. Schoenfield that though foreign countries were not permitted to seize control of any part of the American continents, the United States did not wish to control any country therein. However, should Germany attempt to contravene the principle of self-determination, which would shatter the foundations of peace between the old and new worlds and upset the economic equilibrium, the United States intended to prevent such action.[637]
The American Minister added that the bad relations between the United States and Japan would probably soon improve and that, as long as the leaders of the two countries continued to negotiate, there was a good chance for a composure of relations between the two countries.[638]
184. Japan Inquires About American Treatment of Japanese Nationals
As relations between Japan and the United States grew steadily worse, Tokyo asked Washington for a report on the methods used by the United States in handling Japanese nationals, since it intended to draw up a reply to an American protest against Japan's control of foreign business in Tokyo.
On August 26, 1941, Mr. Kenji Nakauchi, of the Japanese office in Hollywood, replied that printed matter sent from Japan apparently was being censored, although there was no actual proof. Private individuals in the United States often found that newspapers and magazines from Japan had been delayed or confiscated entirely. In one instance photostatic copies had been made of Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire a Japanese official's private letters and diary.
After the Tachibana Incident, Japanese naval officials had been trailed and kept under surveillance, and since that time other Japanese nationals connected with the army and navy also had been watched. In spite of the fact that Captain Yutaka Ishikawa and Commander Sasaki of the Japanese navy had been subjected to an examination by customs officials before boarding the Otowasan Maru to return home, the FBI had also rigorously examined these officers.[639]
[634] III, 398.
[635] III, 399.
[636] Ibid.
[637] III, 400.
[638] III, 401.
[639] III, 402.
Wednesday, May 20, 2009
medical problems 9.lem.q Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire
A substance found in red wine and touted as the chemical equivalent of the fountain of youth probably acts more like a wellspring of health — with warning signs.
Resveratrol, as the chemical is known, does a pretty good job of mimicking some age-defying effects found in studies of animals on calorie-restricted diets. But the substance doesn’t make animals live longer, a new study shows. Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire
At the same time, boosting levels of a key enzyme thought to be responsible for resveratrol action and for the life-extending properties of calorie restriction does protect mice fed high-fat diets from heart problems.
But a third group of researchers warns that more activity of the enzyme, called SirT1, may make brain cells vulnerable to damage.
Some scientists are optimistic that in the near future a pill with resveratrol or something like it could provide the health benefits of a very low-calorie diet. But the new research indicates the drug and the diet regimen don’t necessarily work the same way.
“You have to carefully study the reality, and the reality is, it’s complicated,” says Valter Longo, a molecular geneticist at the University of Southern California’s Andrus Gerontology Center.
For instance, two new studies show that each organ in the body may react differently to calorie restriction, to chemical mimics such as resveratrol, or to different actions of key proteins involved in controlling aging.
Those proteins, called sirtuins, are a group of enzymes found in organisms from bacteria to humans, which have been shown to regulate aging in yeast, roundworms and fruit flies. The proteins were named for the yeast protein Sir2, the first member of the family discovered.
Increasing levels of the mouse sirtuin, SirT1, prevents mice from developing heart problems and fatty livers even when they are fed high-fat diets, researchers at the University of Cincinnati College of Medicine and the Spanish National Cancer Research Center in Madrid reported June 30 in Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences. These mice with higher levels of SirT1 eat more but also burn more calories than do mice with normal levels of the enzyme.
But Longo’s group reported in the July Cell Metabolism that SirT1 may affect the brain differently. Neurons grown in the laboratory were sensitive to oxidative damage when they made normal amounts of SirT1, but reducing the amount of the enzyme helped the brain cells better resist stress.
“This is backwards,” says Leonard Guarente, a molecular and cellular biologist at MIT. Sirtuins are generally thought to protect cells against oxidative damage believed to play a part in aging. Guarente was not involved in any of the current studies, but his lab pioneered studying aging in yeast. “It’s intriguing, but it will take a little more time to figure out what it means in the context of other evidence to the contrary,” he says.
Mice can’t dispense with SirT1 entirely, though. Longo’s group found that mice from which the SirT1 gene was removed entirely died young. Calorie restriction did not lengthen their lives as it does for yeast lacking the similar gene, Sir2.
If SirT1 really makes neurons vulnerable, that’s potentially bad news for resveratrol. The chemical is found in small amounts in grapes, red wine and other foods and is thought to be the component in red wine responsible for the “French paradox” —in which people who eat a high-fat diet are protected from heart disease by consuming wine. Resveratrol has been shown to keep obese mice healthy enough to live a normal life-span (for a mouse). It has been thought to work in the same way as calorie restriction — by activating sirtuins. Sirtuins then modify other proteins, which, in turn, regulate genes involved in inflammation, immunity, stress responses and other processes of aging.
Indeed, an international group of researchers led by Rafael de Cabo at the U.S. National Institute on Aging reported in the July Cell Metabolism that mice fed resveratrol had similar patterns of gene activity as mice fed only every other day. The resveratrol-treated mice had better bone health, less cataract formation and improved coordination compared with other mice their age. Resveratrol also lowered the mice’s cholesterol and made their hearts function better compared with aged mice fed a standard diet. The findings echo others showing the health benefits of calorie restriction and of increased levels of SirT1.
Unfortunately, “the health benefits resveratrol gives these mice are not the things they are dying of,” de Cabo says. Mice generally die of cancer, not heart disease the way humans do. The mice don’t live longer when given resveratrol probably because the chemical doesn’t fight cancer the way calorie restriction seems to.
So far, resveratrol has shown no toxic side effects either in animal or human studies, de Cabo says. And while he takes Longo’s findings seriously, he says resveratrol is likely to have other actions besides just increasing SirT1 activity.
In fact, Tomas Prolla of the University of Wisconsin–Madison and colleagues suggest that resveratrol doesn’t work through SirT1 at all. In a paper published June 4 in PLoS ONE, Prolla’s group reports that resveratrol mimics some of the effects of calorie restriction, but works differently in some crucial ways, such as in how it regulates glucose uptake by muscles. That process is important in the development of diabetes and other medical problems. The compound did not prevent or slow down tumors in the mice.
But the group demonstrated that even at very low doses, resveratrol is a powerful protector of the heart.
To achieve extension of the maximum human life-span, though, scientists will have to develop a way to prevent cancer too, because “humans, like mice, under normal conditions do develop tumors as a consequence of aging,” Prolla says.
But he is optimistic. “I have no doubt the aging process will be understood at the molecular level and we can do something about it,” Prolla says.
Resveratrol, as the chemical is known, does a pretty good job of mimicking some age-defying effects found in studies of animals on calorie-restricted diets. But the substance doesn’t make animals live longer, a new study shows. Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire
At the same time, boosting levels of a key enzyme thought to be responsible for resveratrol action and for the life-extending properties of calorie restriction does protect mice fed high-fat diets from heart problems.
But a third group of researchers warns that more activity of the enzyme, called SirT1, may make brain cells vulnerable to damage.
Some scientists are optimistic that in the near future a pill with resveratrol or something like it could provide the health benefits of a very low-calorie diet. But the new research indicates the drug and the diet regimen don’t necessarily work the same way.
“You have to carefully study the reality, and the reality is, it’s complicated,” says Valter Longo, a molecular geneticist at the University of Southern California’s Andrus Gerontology Center.
For instance, two new studies show that each organ in the body may react differently to calorie restriction, to chemical mimics such as resveratrol, or to different actions of key proteins involved in controlling aging.
Those proteins, called sirtuins, are a group of enzymes found in organisms from bacteria to humans, which have been shown to regulate aging in yeast, roundworms and fruit flies. The proteins were named for the yeast protein Sir2, the first member of the family discovered.
Increasing levels of the mouse sirtuin, SirT1, prevents mice from developing heart problems and fatty livers even when they are fed high-fat diets, researchers at the University of Cincinnati College of Medicine and the Spanish National Cancer Research Center in Madrid reported June 30 in Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences. These mice with higher levels of SirT1 eat more but also burn more calories than do mice with normal levels of the enzyme.
But Longo’s group reported in the July Cell Metabolism that SirT1 may affect the brain differently. Neurons grown in the laboratory were sensitive to oxidative damage when they made normal amounts of SirT1, but reducing the amount of the enzyme helped the brain cells better resist stress.
“This is backwards,” says Leonard Guarente, a molecular and cellular biologist at MIT. Sirtuins are generally thought to protect cells against oxidative damage believed to play a part in aging. Guarente was not involved in any of the current studies, but his lab pioneered studying aging in yeast. “It’s intriguing, but it will take a little more time to figure out what it means in the context of other evidence to the contrary,” he says.
Mice can’t dispense with SirT1 entirely, though. Longo’s group found that mice from which the SirT1 gene was removed entirely died young. Calorie restriction did not lengthen their lives as it does for yeast lacking the similar gene, Sir2.
If SirT1 really makes neurons vulnerable, that’s potentially bad news for resveratrol. The chemical is found in small amounts in grapes, red wine and other foods and is thought to be the component in red wine responsible for the “French paradox” —in which people who eat a high-fat diet are protected from heart disease by consuming wine. Resveratrol has been shown to keep obese mice healthy enough to live a normal life-span (for a mouse). It has been thought to work in the same way as calorie restriction — by activating sirtuins. Sirtuins then modify other proteins, which, in turn, regulate genes involved in inflammation, immunity, stress responses and other processes of aging.
Indeed, an international group of researchers led by Rafael de Cabo at the U.S. National Institute on Aging reported in the July Cell Metabolism that mice fed resveratrol had similar patterns of gene activity as mice fed only every other day. The resveratrol-treated mice had better bone health, less cataract formation and improved coordination compared with other mice their age. Resveratrol also lowered the mice’s cholesterol and made their hearts function better compared with aged mice fed a standard diet. The findings echo others showing the health benefits of calorie restriction and of increased levels of SirT1.
Unfortunately, “the health benefits resveratrol gives these mice are not the things they are dying of,” de Cabo says. Mice generally die of cancer, not heart disease the way humans do. The mice don’t live longer when given resveratrol probably because the chemical doesn’t fight cancer the way calorie restriction seems to.
So far, resveratrol has shown no toxic side effects either in animal or human studies, de Cabo says. And while he takes Longo’s findings seriously, he says resveratrol is likely to have other actions besides just increasing SirT1 activity.
In fact, Tomas Prolla of the University of Wisconsin–Madison and colleagues suggest that resveratrol doesn’t work through SirT1 at all. In a paper published June 4 in PLoS ONE, Prolla’s group reports that resveratrol mimics some of the effects of calorie restriction, but works differently in some crucial ways, such as in how it regulates glucose uptake by muscles. That process is important in the development of diabetes and other medical problems. The compound did not prevent or slow down tumors in the mice.
But the group demonstrated that even at very low doses, resveratrol is a powerful protector of the heart.
To achieve extension of the maximum human life-span, though, scientists will have to develop a way to prevent cancer too, because “humans, like mice, under normal conditions do develop tumors as a consequence of aging,” Prolla says.
But he is optimistic. “I have no doubt the aging process will be understood at the molecular level and we can do something about it,” Prolla says.
Thursday, May 14, 2009
pylori 4.pyl.3 Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire
Children infected with a common stomach bacterium are less likely to have asthma than other kids, according to a study that will appear in the Aug. 15 Journal of Infectious Diseases.
The bug in question, Helicobacter pylori, is a microbe with a history like no other. A longtime resident of the human stomach, H. pylori went largely undetected until Australian scientists discovered it in 1979 and went on to show that it can cause stomach ulcers. Further work has linked it to stomach cancer. It’s now treated with antibiotics whenever detected.
Because H. pylori had been hitchhiking in humans for so long — possibly 50,000 years or more — microbiologist Martin Blaser of New York University became interested in the possible consequences of knocking it out.
He suspected that widespread antibiotic use has been suppressing H. pylori infections in industrialized countries over the past half century. During that same time, asthma has increased markedly.
Blaser and his colleague Yu Chen analyzed a database of health information obtained from people who enrolled in a national health study in either 1999 or 2000. The researchers focused on children, identifying 4,787 who didn’t have an H. pylori infection upon entering the study and 2,625 others who did. Questionnaires completed by study participants (or their parents) showed that children ages 3 to 13 with H. pylori were less than half as likely to have had asthma as were kids without an H. pylori infection.
Children with H. pylori were even less likely to have had, in the previous year, a bout of allergic rhinitis, which is marked by a runny nose, itchy eyes and inflamed nasal passages. And they were less apt to suffer from wheezing, the researchers report.
Blaser cautions that the association does not prove that an H. pylori infection prevents asthma, a chronic condition in which lung passages can become inflamed by contact with an allergen, smoke, pet dander or any number of other substances. Like allergies, asthma is an overreaction of the immune system to an innocuous substance.
Nevertheless, it’s possible that an H. pylori infection might somehow quell the immune system, Blaser says, or more likely induce the production of compounds that do. Or, H. pylori might just be a marker of something else that protects against asthma, he says.
It’s unclear how H. pylori spreads, but children living in messier households could have more H. pylori infections, says gastroenterologist David Graham of the Baylor College of Medicine and at the Michael E. DeBakey Veterans Affairs Medical Center, both in Houston. Thus, its apparent antiasthma effect might actually result from poor hygiene, he says.
Under a school of thought called the hygiene hypothesis, children who grow up in squeaky clean environments have more asthma and allergies than do kids raised in contact with farm animals or in other less sanitary conditions. The idea is that the immune systems of children in messy environments get regular challenges and thus mature properly.
Even if H. pylori did prevent asthma, the infection is not worth having, Graham says. “One would not allow king cobras to live in one’s house just because they might eat rats,” he says. “H. pylori is a king cobra equivalent in terms of the harm done to humans.”
Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire Patients would be better served if doctors could find a way to condition the immune system to achieve the effect of a dirty environment without the negative consequences, Graham says.
The bug in question, Helicobacter pylori, is a microbe with a history like no other. A longtime resident of the human stomach, H. pylori went largely undetected until Australian scientists discovered it in 1979 and went on to show that it can cause stomach ulcers. Further work has linked it to stomach cancer. It’s now treated with antibiotics whenever detected.
Because H. pylori had been hitchhiking in humans for so long — possibly 50,000 years or more — microbiologist Martin Blaser of New York University became interested in the possible consequences of knocking it out.
He suspected that widespread antibiotic use has been suppressing H. pylori infections in industrialized countries over the past half century. During that same time, asthma has increased markedly.
Blaser and his colleague Yu Chen analyzed a database of health information obtained from people who enrolled in a national health study in either 1999 or 2000. The researchers focused on children, identifying 4,787 who didn’t have an H. pylori infection upon entering the study and 2,625 others who did. Questionnaires completed by study participants (or their parents) showed that children ages 3 to 13 with H. pylori were less than half as likely to have had asthma as were kids without an H. pylori infection.
Children with H. pylori were even less likely to have had, in the previous year, a bout of allergic rhinitis, which is marked by a runny nose, itchy eyes and inflamed nasal passages. And they were less apt to suffer from wheezing, the researchers report.
Blaser cautions that the association does not prove that an H. pylori infection prevents asthma, a chronic condition in which lung passages can become inflamed by contact with an allergen, smoke, pet dander or any number of other substances. Like allergies, asthma is an overreaction of the immune system to an innocuous substance.
Nevertheless, it’s possible that an H. pylori infection might somehow quell the immune system, Blaser says, or more likely induce the production of compounds that do. Or, H. pylori might just be a marker of something else that protects against asthma, he says.
It’s unclear how H. pylori spreads, but children living in messier households could have more H. pylori infections, says gastroenterologist David Graham of the Baylor College of Medicine and at the Michael E. DeBakey Veterans Affairs Medical Center, both in Houston. Thus, its apparent antiasthma effect might actually result from poor hygiene, he says.
Under a school of thought called the hygiene hypothesis, children who grow up in squeaky clean environments have more asthma and allergies than do kids raised in contact with farm animals or in other less sanitary conditions. The idea is that the immune systems of children in messy environments get regular challenges and thus mature properly.
Even if H. pylori did prevent asthma, the infection is not worth having, Graham says. “One would not allow king cobras to live in one’s house just because they might eat rats,” he says. “H. pylori is a king cobra equivalent in terms of the harm done to humans.”
Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire Patients would be better served if doctors could find a way to condition the immune system to achieve the effect of a dirty environment without the negative consequences, Graham says.
Monday, May 4, 2009
news 9.new.23 Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire
When doctors are looking to treat an illness, they often rely on reports in medical journals. Sometimes those reports describe striking successes with a particular therapy. Less frequently, they highlight failures. To physicians, learning what doesn’t work or has troubling side effects can be as important as knowing which therapies hit a home run.
Yet doctors — and the reporters who highlight research news — are getting a very skewed picture of research findings if they rely on what makes it into major medical journals.
The reason: Data from fewer than one in five research trials are ever published. Findings from the vast majority of human trials become buried for reasons that may never come to light, according to a new study in The Oncologist. It’s published early and online September 24.
For the past nine years, the National Institutes of Health have maintained a registry of medical trials. Researchers must list theirs with this ClinicalTrials.gov registry. If they don’t, major medical journals (those that belong to the International Committee of Medical Journal Editors) will not publish the trial’s findings.
Scott Ramsey and John Scoggins of the University of Washington, Seattle, scoured that registry for any trial that was supposed to have been conducted to gauge the effectiveness of cancer treatments — and turned up 2,028. The pair then cross-checked these trials against all published studies that were listed in PubMed, a comprehensive database compiled by the National Library of Medicine. http://LOUIS2J2SHEEHAN.US PubMed includes citations to all medical and related studies that have been published in peer-reviewed journals.
Among the cancer trials that were identified as completed or halted as of a year ago, just 17.6 percent were ultimately published in PubMed-listed journals, Ramsey and Scoggins report.
Okay, maybe the halted trials were pulled because of what turned out to be poor research design, failure to recruit enough patients, or some other reasonable issue. But even after restricting the analysis to only those trials that were completed, the share that ended up being published still amounted to fewer than one in five.
Who conducted a trial seemed to influence the likelihood its data would see the light of day. Studies sponsored by industry (such as drug companies) had the lowest publication rate: 5.9 percent. By comparison, data from 59 percent of studies performed by clinical-trial networks were published.
Ramsey and Scoggins turned up 341 cancer trials from the registry that were published. Of these, two-thirds reported positive — expected and beneficial — findings.
The new analysis raises the ugly specter of publication bias, its authors say. The assumption is that many if not most unpublished trials involved treatments that didn’t work. “Of particular concern,” they argue, is the especially poor showing by industry-sponsored trials, since they tended to probe the value of patented drugs — “many of which are in clinical use.”
James H. Doroshow, director of the National Cancer Institute’s division of treatment and diagnosis, notes that last year alone some 50,000 patients took part in trials that his institute funded. The “apparent lack of access to the final efficacy and toxicity data for cancer clinical trials from all sponsors, but especially for industry-sponsored studies, poses multiple scientific and ethical questions,” he charges in an editorial accompanying the new paper.
For instance, as doctors begin developing novel chemotherapy cocktails — mixtures of drugs initially tested on their own — toxic reactions may emerge. It’s imperative, Doroshow says, that inklings of such side effects be communicated immediately “to the entire oncology community in the peer-reviewed literature.”
Moreover, he notes that some drug-safety trials did not publish their findings, or did not do so early enough, such that they could inform subsequent trials. This practice is not likely to continue, he points out, since new federal rules will fine investigators who fail to post outcome data for all trials getting money from Uncle Sam. Moreover, for cancer trials, NCI will require that researchers begin reporting outcome data — treatment successes and failures — throughout the course of the trial, not just at the end.
A second editorial, this one by The Oncologist’s senior editor, Gregory A. Curt (an employee of drug company AstraZeneca), and editor-in-chief Bruce A. Chabner (of Harvard Medical School) find the new analysis by Ramsey and Scoggins “thought-provoking and disturbing.” At a minimum, they argue, publication of trial data should be considered “an obligation” for any researchers recruiting patients who contribute “their precious time and well-being, and for some, their very lives.”
This is especially true for drug-company trials, they contend, since “industry has become the dominant sponsor of new drug trials.”
But Curt and Chabner also suspect that part of the problem illustrated in the new paper traces to issues other than a drug company’s interest in hiding bad data.
For instance, study authors “face the hurdle of finding a journal willing to publish a negative, poorly designed or inadequately accruing trial.” This is especially true, they say, since “Journals live and die based on their Impact Factor” — how often they’re cited by subsequent papers. Any journal filled with such findings would “not attract readership, citations and advertisement,” they write.
One solution Curt and Chabner propose: Make NCI funding for new trials dependent on the investigators’ past track record of getting their trials data — both positive and negative — published. They also argue that there’s “a need for a new venue” to record outcomes of well-executed but ultimately negative clinical trials. This database must be searchable via PubMed and other search engines. Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire Currently, these editors note, The Oncologist is considering whether it should become a repository for such cancer data.
Bottom line: It should become increasingly harder for drug companies and others to bury embarrassing findings. But the impacts of coming changes might not show up for five years or more. In the mean time, let’s hope our research-funding agencies, our hospitals and our doctors don’t assume that when it comes to trial data, no news is good news.
Yet doctors — and the reporters who highlight research news — are getting a very skewed picture of research findings if they rely on what makes it into major medical journals.
The reason: Data from fewer than one in five research trials are ever published. Findings from the vast majority of human trials become buried for reasons that may never come to light, according to a new study in The Oncologist. It’s published early and online September 24.
For the past nine years, the National Institutes of Health have maintained a registry of medical trials. Researchers must list theirs with this ClinicalTrials.gov registry. If they don’t, major medical journals (those that belong to the International Committee of Medical Journal Editors) will not publish the trial’s findings.
Scott Ramsey and John Scoggins of the University of Washington, Seattle, scoured that registry for any trial that was supposed to have been conducted to gauge the effectiveness of cancer treatments — and turned up 2,028. The pair then cross-checked these trials against all published studies that were listed in PubMed, a comprehensive database compiled by the National Library of Medicine. http://LOUIS2J2SHEEHAN.US PubMed includes citations to all medical and related studies that have been published in peer-reviewed journals.
Among the cancer trials that were identified as completed or halted as of a year ago, just 17.6 percent were ultimately published in PubMed-listed journals, Ramsey and Scoggins report.
Okay, maybe the halted trials were pulled because of what turned out to be poor research design, failure to recruit enough patients, or some other reasonable issue. But even after restricting the analysis to only those trials that were completed, the share that ended up being published still amounted to fewer than one in five.
Who conducted a trial seemed to influence the likelihood its data would see the light of day. Studies sponsored by industry (such as drug companies) had the lowest publication rate: 5.9 percent. By comparison, data from 59 percent of studies performed by clinical-trial networks were published.
Ramsey and Scoggins turned up 341 cancer trials from the registry that were published. Of these, two-thirds reported positive — expected and beneficial — findings.
The new analysis raises the ugly specter of publication bias, its authors say. The assumption is that many if not most unpublished trials involved treatments that didn’t work. “Of particular concern,” they argue, is the especially poor showing by industry-sponsored trials, since they tended to probe the value of patented drugs — “many of which are in clinical use.”
James H. Doroshow, director of the National Cancer Institute’s division of treatment and diagnosis, notes that last year alone some 50,000 patients took part in trials that his institute funded. The “apparent lack of access to the final efficacy and toxicity data for cancer clinical trials from all sponsors, but especially for industry-sponsored studies, poses multiple scientific and ethical questions,” he charges in an editorial accompanying the new paper.
For instance, as doctors begin developing novel chemotherapy cocktails — mixtures of drugs initially tested on their own — toxic reactions may emerge. It’s imperative, Doroshow says, that inklings of such side effects be communicated immediately “to the entire oncology community in the peer-reviewed literature.”
Moreover, he notes that some drug-safety trials did not publish their findings, or did not do so early enough, such that they could inform subsequent trials. This practice is not likely to continue, he points out, since new federal rules will fine investigators who fail to post outcome data for all trials getting money from Uncle Sam. Moreover, for cancer trials, NCI will require that researchers begin reporting outcome data — treatment successes and failures — throughout the course of the trial, not just at the end.
A second editorial, this one by The Oncologist’s senior editor, Gregory A. Curt (an employee of drug company AstraZeneca), and editor-in-chief Bruce A. Chabner (of Harvard Medical School) find the new analysis by Ramsey and Scoggins “thought-provoking and disturbing.” At a minimum, they argue, publication of trial data should be considered “an obligation” for any researchers recruiting patients who contribute “their precious time and well-being, and for some, their very lives.”
This is especially true for drug-company trials, they contend, since “industry has become the dominant sponsor of new drug trials.”
But Curt and Chabner also suspect that part of the problem illustrated in the new paper traces to issues other than a drug company’s interest in hiding bad data.
For instance, study authors “face the hurdle of finding a journal willing to publish a negative, poorly designed or inadequately accruing trial.” This is especially true, they say, since “Journals live and die based on their Impact Factor” — how often they’re cited by subsequent papers. Any journal filled with such findings would “not attract readership, citations and advertisement,” they write.
One solution Curt and Chabner propose: Make NCI funding for new trials dependent on the investigators’ past track record of getting their trials data — both positive and negative — published. They also argue that there’s “a need for a new venue” to record outcomes of well-executed but ultimately negative clinical trials. This database must be searchable via PubMed and other search engines. Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire Currently, these editors note, The Oncologist is considering whether it should become a repository for such cancer data.
Bottom line: It should become increasingly harder for drug companies and others to bury embarrassing findings. But the impacts of coming changes might not show up for five years or more. In the mean time, let’s hope our research-funding agencies, our hospitals and our doctors don’t assume that when it comes to trial data, no news is good news.
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